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In this carefully argued and thought-provoking book, Mark Murphy defends 
a novel response to the problem of reconciling the existence of a perfect God 
with the evils we find in the world. This response denies that, other things 
equal, God would be motivated to eliminate the kinds of evils we observe. For 
while we – rightly – take others’ well-being and suffering to provide us with 
requiring reasons to promote that well-being and prevent that suffering, these 
same reasons do not extend to God.
Murphy defends this response by explicating God’s ethics – that is, the dis-
positions God has to treat various facts as reasons for action. Part i of the book 
(chapters 1–6) explores God’s ethics inasmuch as God is a perfect being – a 
being possessing, to a maximal degree, all properties that make one unquali-
fiedly greater. Murphy calls God so understood “the Anselmian being.”
The Anselmian being is perfectly rational, and so must be morally good 
in the formal sense of rationally responding to value. And the perfection of 
the Anselmian being’s agency implies that the Anselmian being can never 
intend – either as an end or as a means – that evil befall creatures. But Murphy 
denies that the Anselmian being is rationally required to prevent creaturely evils, 
or promote creaturely goods. Canonical (Hobbesian, Humean, Aristotelian, 
and Kantian) explanations for why we are rationally required to promote 
our fellow humans’ welfare appeal to features (such as human psychology or 
human nature) we do not share with the Anselmian being. One might respond 
that we have intrinsic value, and all agents are rationally required to promote 
intrinsic value. But, Murphy argues, the Anselmian being’s sovereignty consists 
partly in being the only being with intrinsic value. Other beings’ value comes 
only from participation in the Anselmian being’s value. Consequently, while 
creating us and promoting our welfare brings about more good things, it does 
not bring about more goodness.
Nevertheless, the Anselmian being does have justifying reasons to promote 
our welfare. (Requiring reasons rationally require action, unless counterbal-
anced by equally weighty reasons; justifying reasons justify but do not require 
action.) The fact that creating and perfecting us to some degree would be good 
for us is a reason for the Anselmian being to do so – but because this situa-
tion is not better overall from some agent-neutral point of view, this reason is 
merely justifying, and not requiring.
Since the Anselmian being has only justifying and not requiring reasons to 
promote our welfare, there is no reason to expect that being to prevent the 
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evils we observe. As such, there is no good argument from evil against the exist-
ence of such a being.
One might reasonably worry, though, that a being completely indifferent 
to our welfare is not one whom we would owe worship and allegiance. Part 
ii (chapters 7–9) turns to this challenge. Murphy argues that the Anselmian 
being is necessarily worthy of our worship, but not necessarily worthy of our 
allegiance. However, the Anselmian being can become worthy of our alle-
giance – and so become our God – by imposing constraints on the Anselmian 
being’s own willing, and so adopting a contingent ethics. These ethics need 
not be exactly the same as ours. But they do need to be sufficiently oriented 
towards our good that we can reasonably ally ourselves with and subordinate 
ourselves to the Anselmian being.
On Murphy’s preferred model of God’s contingent ethics, it is part of God’s 
will that we act “in accordance with the norms of practical reasonableness that 
apply to us and … that, should we subordinate our wills to the divine will for 
our action, then all will be well for us” (p. 188). On this model, it makes sense 
for us to obey and ally ourselves with God, for in so doing we will not be vio-
lating any practical norms, and we can be assured that we will ultimately be 
better off. Moreover, this model fits with the Biblical depiction of God as mak-
ing covenants with humanity. But this model of God’s will does not entail that 
God will be motivated to prevent the earthly evils that befall us, for an earthly 
life free of evils is only one of multiple ways our lives might ultimately go well 
for us. So these evils are no barrier to our holding that the Anselmian being is 
worthy of our allegiance, or that the Anselmian being is the God revealed in 
the Bible.
While Murphy’s focus is on atheistic arguments from evil, his book is filled 
with careful analyses that will be useful to philosophers working on a broad 
range of topics, including the nature of God, the relation of God and morality, 
the good of religion, the analysis of reasons, and the doctrine of double effect. 
For example, in section 6.5, Murphy considers whether the claim that God 
cannot intend evil is in tension with the evils we observe. Suppose we think 
(perhaps because of revelation) that if God exists, God intends the existence of 
rational animals. This end has come about as the result of evolution by natural 
selection, a process that essentially involves creaturely evils (such as prema-
ture deaths). So, one might think, God must have intended those evil means.
Murphy responds by distinguishing between “making use” of a foreseen evil 
and intending that evil as a means. Suppose I drink caffeine to help me finish 
a job application due at midnight, foreseeing that this will make me unable 
to sleep tonight. I do not intend to stay up all night (I would prefer that the 
caffeine not have this effect), but foreseeing that I will, I intend to make the 
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most of it and watch the World Cup final live at 3:00 am. Similarly, God might 
choose to bring about some good G1, foreseeing that this will result in some 
unintended evil E; and subsequently make use of E in bringing about an addi-
tional good G2. That God uses evils to bring about the existence of rational 
creatures then does not entail that God intends those evils; they might instead 
be the foreseen but unintended result of some earlier independent good that 
God aimed at.
I found this depiction of divine choice a helpful corrective to the “world-ac-
tualization” model more common in the philosophy of religion, which imagi-
nes God surveying entire possible worlds, and choosing one to make actual. 
The world-actualization model obscures any distinction between intending 
and foreseeing, and invites a consequentialist model of God’s ethics, on which 
the primary ethical choice facing God is how much total goodness to actual-
ize. Murphy’s model of logically ordered local intentions is superior in these 
respects; and it could fruitfully be applied to other problems in the philosophy 
of religion, such as the relationship between divine providence and human 
free actions.
One point in Murphy’s argument moves a bit quickly. In section 6.3, Murphy 
considers Paul Draper’s evidential argument from evil, according to which the 
pains and pleasures we observe are less probable given theism than given the 
rival hypothesis that our nature and condition are not caused by any benev-
olent or malevolent agency. Murphy responds that because the Anselmian 
being has justifying but not requiring reasons to promote creaturely welfare, 
“the features of the created world are a matter of divine discretion,” so that 
the Anselmian being is not disposed to create in any particular way (p. 109). 
Consequently, there is no probability that the Anselmian being would create in 
this way, as opposed to some other rationally permissible way.
It was not clear to me why the existence of divine discretion in choosing 
between different options implies that the probability of choosing one option 
rather than another is indeterminate or non-existent. First, the lack of requir-
ing reasons to φ rather than ψ does not seem to imply the lack of a disposition 
to φ rather than ψ. It’s natural to think that (for rational agents) justifying rea-
sons, while not necessitating, are nevertheless motivating, in that they incline 
the agent somewhat towards the action they justify. And second, even if God 
is equally disposed towards all rationally available actions, shouldn’t this make 
all these actions equally probable? Further analysis of the relation between 
reasons, dispositions, and probabilities would be helpful here.
An argument as ambitious as Murphy’s will inevitably have some debat-
able steps. But on the whole, Murphy is impressively thorough. He not only 
argues for the truth of his various theses, but provides a general framework for 
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thinking about God, reasons, goodness, and agency that explains why these 
theses must be true. The result is that even if you disagree with Murphy’s 
account of God’s ethics, this disagreement is unlikely to turn simply on a dif-
ferent intuition about a case or a quibble about a counterexample. Instead, you 
will find yourself having to defend substantive and controversial rival claims 
about God, reasons, goodness, and agency. God willing, Murphy’s book will 
encourage further careful work on these important topics.
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